Published in edited and shortened form under the heading ‘“Strategic Ambiguity” on Taiwan Suits Our National Interests’, The Australian, 2 October 2026, p. 11.
It is time to discard myths associated with Australia, China, and Taiwan.
Hugh White’s latest book Hard New World. Australia’s Post-American Future (2026) argues that the United States should not go to war with China over Taiwan because they cannot win and the risk of a major war is too high. The implication is that Australia should steer clear. Former Foreign Minister and NSW Premier Bob Carr advocates for strategic ambiguity and opposes Australian participation if the US goes to war over Taiwan. More pointedly, former Prime Minister Paul Keating asserts that Taiwan is “Chinese real estate” and not a vital national interest for Australia. All three go on to say AUKUS imperils Australia because the Americans could drag Australia into a nuclear war. Are they right?
It is worth recapitulating Australian policy, historically and recently with regard to Taiwan, and comparing this that trio’s stances. The argument is that strategic ambiguity is a no brainer, both for Taiwan’s future and for foreseeable American requests for assistance if the worst was to happen.
Australia has a one China policy. In December 1972, Australia recognised the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) and “acknowledged” Beijing’s claim over Taiwan. Besides the diplomatic and huge trade relationships with Beijing, there is also economic engagement with Taiwan. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade website states: “The Australian Government strongly supports the development, on an unofficial basis, of economic and cultural relations with Taiwan including a range of two-way visits, state, territory and local government contacts, trade and investment opportunities and people-to-people links. Australia supports Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organisations and conferences.” Hence Australian support for Taiwan’s participation in APEC, under Hawke and Keating and ever since.
For decades, “strategic ambiguity” was the policy position of the United States and allies concerning Taiwan. That is, in the hypothetical scenario of an attempted PRC invasion, not saying beforehand whether the US would intervene or not. But as the Chinese expanded military capability, including colonising and militarising islands in the South China Sea, the American posture shifted. President Biden spoke at least three times during his presidency about American commitment to defending Taiwan. Some policy “experts” in Australia, including John Lee, then at the US Studies Centre, advocated an end to vagueness and, instead, a robust commitment to Taiwan. This seems both unwise and unnecessary. President Trump, though you can never be entirely sure, has returned to “strategic ambiguity”.
According to the Washington DC-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, Taiwan produces over 90 percent of the most cutting-edge chips used in smartphones, data centres, and advanced military equipment. Disruptions to the supply of these technologies could wipe trillions of dollars from global GDP. (Crossroads of Commerce: How the Taiwan Strait Propels the Global Economy, updated June 2026). Taiwan matters. So, more powerfully does China. Though it is worth noting that the combined trade between Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia is approximately as large as PRC-Australian trade.
There is growing PRC pressure on Taiwan – increased Chinese military flight over-paths, military drills, mock exercises preparing for invasion. And then there’s China’s “nine-dash lines”, their assertion of maritime sovereignty over almost all the South China Sea, right up to the waters lapping the coastlines of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia. There is also the semi-regular Chinese naval exercises off Australia’s coastline and the splashing down in the Pacific of Chinese ballistic missiles. In Kevin Rudd’s assessment, Xi Jinping, who should “never be under-estimated”, shifted left on party control and hard-right nationalist in building the strike capacity of the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) to “take” Taiwan.
The Australian position is reflected in September’s Joint Statement of Foreign Ministers of Australia, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Poland, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom: “We emphasize the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. We encourage dialogue and oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.”
This means cautioning the Taiwan ruling party, the Democratic Progressive Party, against declaring unilateral independence. Australia is no friend, either, of China-hawks. Preserving the status quo and its inherent ambiguities, is in everyone’s interests.
Relevantly, the Russian invasion of Ukraine teaches a few lessons. First, western intelligence agencies were taken by surprise by the Russian invasion. The mindset of the Russian elite, their intelligence, and military preparedness, was also in error. Could the Chinese similarly overreach with any Taiwan adventure? Further, although Americans and Europeans feared Russian nuclear strikes against Ukraine, that did not happen. To his credit, President Xi Jinping reportedly counselled President Putin not to press the red button.
The war in the Ukraine spawned unpredictable consequences. One is that the “CRINK alliance” – China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, “their AUKUS”, saw a massive transfer of technology, weapons capabilities, and military training between them. China and Russia describe their alliance as “a no-limit partnership”. Iran-made drones and missiles flood the skies from Russia to Kyiv. The deployment of North Korean troops to fight for Russia is another menacing aspect. But CRINK is a reason for western allies to collaborate. The old line applies: To prepare for peace requires preparation for war, just in case. This is not to justify every aspect of the price docket, just the principle that close western allies must collaborate.
Interestingly, Taiwan is holding a referendum this November on repealing its “nuclear-free homeland” policy. Taiwan’s main opposition party, the Kuomintang, proposed the referendum with support from the opposition Taiwan People’s Party. This followed Chinese media images last December showing PLA missile strikes on mock Taiwanese LNG storage facilities, a rehearsal for cutting off Taiwan’s power supply. Nuclear power capacity would allow Taiwan to reduce its reliance on imported liquefied natural gas for electricity generation and reduce energy-related vulnerability.
Late in August, Taiwan conducted live fire artillery drills integrating unmanned systems with traditional platforms. Taiwan is demonstrating tactical lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, with applications to potential Taiwan invasion scenarios.
Why the strident warnings by the above-mentioned trio about nuclear conflict over Taiwan? This sounds an unlikely scenario. Would any Chinese leader wipe millions of “fellow Chinese” off the map with nuclear strikes on Taiwan? (The mass-murder Mao-era was 50-years ago. The Chinese Communist Party is ruthless. But unlike the “closed” Mao era, images of slaughter and destruction, especially over a protracted period, might undermine the Party’s standing.)
Carr, in early September at a Generation Australia seminar at the University of NSW, speculated that seven or eight sites in Australia could be struck by China in case of war with the US over Taiwan. Carr says that if the worst outcome for Taiwan resembled the political system currently prevailing in Hong Kong, “then I can live with that” instead of risking nuclear war. But is it a binary choice? Is not the status quo preferable and possible?
Noteworthy in Hong Kong is: the Territory’s leading trade unionist, Lee Cheuk-yan is imprisoned for a peaceful, “illegal assembly” and recently copped another seven years jail term; the Apple Daily newspaper founder and entrepreneur Jimmy Lai is behind bars, found last December by Hong Kong’s High Court as “guilty of collusion and sedition” for calling for multi-party elections and democratic norms, and then sentenced to 20 years in prison; bookshop-owners learn to de-stock critical books about the regime. Rudd’s tome On Xi Jinping. How Xi’s Marxist Nationalism is Shaping China and the World (2025) must be ordered surreptitiously, as it is unavailable in “good” bookshops there.
From a realist perspective, the world is unlovely. Why should Australians “suffer” or be placed in jeopardy with misplaced idealism or become prey to unpredictable American hotheadedness? Unlovely, too, is any invasion by China. Acting in our own strategic interests, in real time, is fundamental to Australia’s interests. We too offer strategic ambiguity concerning any future American “requests”. AUKUS can never be an automatic reassignment of Australian sovereignty and does not require it. There is no compulsion that Australia do anything.
Turning to AUKUS, what seems to concern White, Carr, and Keating is the potential of the American alliance dragging Australia into war, and the increased linkages and presence of US forces on Australian soil. For example, at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia, the rotational presence from 2027 of up to four US and one UK nuclear-powered submarines, and the purchase of Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines from the United States in the early 2030s, supposedly increase Australia becoming a target. Often overlooked is that the AUKUS agreements also accelerate joint development in quantum technologies, advanced cyber, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence, autonomy, and hypersonics. For example, Uncrewed Undersea Vehicles (UUVs), of which Australia has limited expertise, was launched to develop cutting-edge payloads and enabling systems for UUVs, with deployment and delivery starting in 2027. AUKUS deserves a separate and detailed account of its utility, but these points are clues about enhanced American-UK-Australian military potency.
But for now, returning to Taiwan’s potential to unscrew the lid off regional stability, this is all about Chinese manoeuvres and actions. If blockades and a military conflict occur with Taiwan, as with Russia-Ukraine, it is likely to be “conventional” (if that is still the right word) and not nuclear, and before the first AUKUS nuclear sub is delivered to Australia. Yet as former Australian Defence Secretary Denis Richardson observed, if the US and China went to war over Taiwan, Australia would be unable to avoid the conflict, such as via the joint-defence facilities at Pine Gap and Exmouth which provide early warning of nuclear attack. Australian policy has long been that such facilities mitigate the risk of war and surprise attacks.
No one sensible in Australia wants conflict. There are no gung-ho jingoists in the Australian Cabinet. There is no sounding of the drumbeats of war over Taiwan in Washington or Canberra. The trio as aforementioned underestimate the positive in ensuring the peace.
The PM’s and the Foreign Minister’s oft repeated statement on China is that “we cooperate where we can, disagree where we must and engage in the national interest”. In shorthand, Australia chooses to support stability, economic cooperation, and peaceful coexistence, excellent PRC relations, strategic ambiguity, the status quo. There is nothing Dr Strangelove about that.
Postscript
I suggested to The Australian that they refer to me as: Dr Michael Easson AM writes on Australian foreign policy. He wrote ‘The Drift of Foreign Policy’ in Scott Prasser, ed., Promise and Performance. Albanese’s First Term (Connor Court, 2025), but, alas, a reference to the Northfield Foundation was included in my bio, irrelevant to this piece
How the article appeared in The Australian:
